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ABSTRACT
In this paper the relationship between the demand for international
reserves and exchange rate adjustments is empirically investigated for a
group of LDC's. It is shown that countries that have maintained a fixed
exchange rate for a long period of time have a different demand function
than countries that have occasionally used exchange rate adjustments for cor-
recting payments imbalances. The dynamics of the adjustment for both groups
of countries are also analyzed. The results show that while bothgroups
tend to eliminate reserve disequilibria fast, those countries that have maintained
a fixed rate tend to do it more slowly than countries that have occasionally
devalued their currency. It Is also shown that the year prior to a devalua-
tion, international reserves have been, on average, 30% below their short—run
desired level. These results are important since they indicate that not all
LDC's should be aggregated for prediction purposes. The results also have
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In most recent empirical studies of the demand for internationalreserves a
distinction has been made between developed and less developedcountries, and
separate functions for these two groups have been estimated.-' However,
classifying countries only according to their degree of economic development
does not allow one to discriminate between their willingness touse alternative
tools to correct international payments imbalances. In particular,most of
the recent empirical work on the demand for internationalreserves does not
distinguish between countries that have been willing to use exchange rate
adjustments (i.e., devaluations) to correct international payments difficulties
from those countries that have practically ruled out theexchange rate as a
policy tool.'
From a theoretical point of view, however, the demand for international
reserves will be different in countries that rely exclusively on expenditure—
changing policies, and in countries that are also willing to use expenditure—
switching policies to solve temporary payments problems. In general, it
would be expected that countries that are willing to use theexchange rate as
a tool for correcting transitory payments imbalances would want to hold less
reserves (on average) as a buffer stock to finance those payments problems.--'
This fact has been recognized by a number of authors. Kelly (1970,p. 656),
for example, argues that "the final option is to alter the peg...[s]ucha
policy would also require the holding of less reserves." Hipple (1974,
page 30), on the other hand, has pointed out that "if a nation is willing to
change its exchange rate frequently, it will have a reduced need for reserves."
See also Clark (l970a), Crockett (1978), Claasen (1976), Flanders(1971) and
Makin (1974). If this is the case, then it would be incorrectto pool these
two groups of countries for prediction or otherpurposes. In particular,
studies on the adequacy and distribution of internationalreserves based on
common (for all LDC's) demand estimates will be highly tnisleading.-'—2—
In this paper, the demand for international reserves by less developed
countries (LDC's) is analyzed, making an explicit distinction between countries
that have maintained a fixed exchange rate for a long period of time and
countries that have occasionally used devaluations as a means to correct pay-
ments imbalances. The results obtained indicate that both groups of countries
have different demand functions for international reserves, with devaluation
countries holding, on average, less reserves, and that they should not be pooled,
as has often been done. Furthermore, the results indicate that the demand for
international reserves function for those LDC's that have maintained a fixed
exchange rate is very similar to estimates previously obtained by other authors
(i.e. ,Frenkel,1980) for developed countries. The dynamics of the adjustment
of international reserves for these two groups of LDC's is also analyzed, and
it is found that fixed exchange rate countries tend to correct discrepancies
between actual and desired reserves slower than countries that occasionally
adjust their exchange rates. Finally, the relationship between the devaluation
episodes included in the sample, and reserves holdings, is investigated. The
results show that the year prior to the devaluation, international reserves
in these countries have been, on average, 30% below their short—run desired
level.
2.The Demand for International Reserves by Less Developed Countries
This section presents estimates of the long—run demand for international
reserves for a group of 23 LDC's that maintained a fixed exchange rate during
1964—1972, and for a group of 18 LDC's that devalued their currencies at least
once during this period. In this study fixed rate countries were defined as
those that adjusted their parities less than 1% a year. On the other hand,
devaluation countries were defined as those that had devaluations of at least—3--
Most recent studies on the demand for international reserves have assumed
that reserves are held both to finance international transactions and as a
buffer stock to face unexpected payments difficulties. These studies have
assumed that the demand for international reserves is a stable function of
a small number of variables reflecting the scale of the country, the variability
of its payments, its degree of openness and the opportunity cost of holding
reserves. It has been postulated (Frenkel, 1974; Heller and Khan, 1978)
that the larger the scale of the country in question, the larger will be
the volume of reserves it would want to hold. The scale of a country has
usually been measured by its total imports or total income.
With respect to external disturbances, most authors have assumed that the
higher the variability of a country's external payments, the higher the level
of reserves it would desire to hold (Clark 1970a, Kelly 1971, Hipple 1974,
Claasen 1976). Also, most models assume that the more open a country is to
the world economy, the more vulnerable it will be to external shocks and,
as a consequence, the higher the level of reserves it will demand (Frenkel 1974,
Ripple 1974, lyoha 1976). The degree of openness of a particular country has
6/ usually been associated with its marginal propensity to import.—
Finally, since by holding resources in the form of international reserves
a country foregoes income, it has usually been assumed that the higher the
alternative cost of holding these reserves, the lower the demand for them
(Heller, 1966; Kelly, 1970; Clark, 1970a; Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981).
However, most empirical studies on the demand for international reserves
have found that the coefficient of the opportunity cost of holding reserves ——
usuallymeasured by the domestic interest rate ——isnot significant.2'
For these reasons, and considering the difficulties in obtaining reliable
data on interest rates in LDC's, in this study, as in those by Clark (1970b),
Frenkel (1974, 1978, 1980), Heller and Khan (1978), Bilson and Frenkel (1979),—4—
and Saidi (1981), the opportunity cost variable has been dropped from the
empirical analysis. Based on these considerations, the following demand
function for international reserves ——suggestedby Bilson and Frenkel (1979) ——
wasestimated, using cross—section data for 1964—1972, for both groups of
LDC's (for alternative specifications, see Edwards, 1981):
log R =b+ b log Y + b log m + b log G+ u (1)
n o 1 n 2 n 3 n n
where Y is income, and is included as a measure of the country's scale; m is
the average propensity to import ——usedas a proxy for the marginal propensity
8/
to import; Grepresentspayments variability; and u is a random element.—
According to the above discussion, it would be expected that b1>0, b2>0, and b3>0.
According to the hypothesis that countries willing to use exchange rate
adjustments have a different demand function than fixed exchange rate countries,
it would be expected that (at least some of) the b's would be significantly
different for these two groups of countries. In this paper, this hypothesis
is tested using Gujarathi's (1970) dummy variable procedure.
Tables 1 and 2 present the cross—section results obtained from the esti-
mation of equation (1) for fixed exchange rate LDC's and for countries that
have adjusted their parity, or devaluation countries. As may be seen,
these results are quite different for both groups. While for the case of
fixed—rate countries most coefficients (except the constants) are significant,
for the case of devaluation countries only the coefficient of log Y is sig-
nificant in all periods. The results for fixed exchange rate LDC's (Table 1)
contrast sharply with the results obtained by Frenkel (1980) for a group of
32 LDC's that include both countries that have adjusted their parity and
fixed rate LDC's. While in Frenkel's case the variability term was only
significant in two of the nine years, in the results reported in Table 1
it is significant in all but two of the nine years.—5—
Table 1
The Demand for International Reserves
by Fixed Exchange Rate LDC's
Cross—Section Results: 1964—1972
(OLS)
Year Constant log Y log m log 0 F R2
1964 1.591 1.392 2.017 .303 47.9 .883
(1.233) (.118) (.386) (.201)
1965 —.472 1.248 1.858 .372 39.0 .860
(1.339) (.120) (.378) (.213)
1966 —.101 1.324 1.929 .677 41.6 .868
(1.181) (.122) (.353) (.204)
1967 .032 1.391 2.175 .758 43.8 .874
(1.140) (.123) (.365) (.192)
1968 .237 1.327 2.012 .750 42.5 .870
(1.113) (.123) (.353) (.187)
1969 —.101 1.321 1.894 .679 43.4 .873
(1.061) (.119) (.332) (.178)
1970 .009 1.302 1.703 .816 32.9 .838
(1.185) (.135) (.380) (.205)
1971 —.715 1.346 1.660 .658 42.1 .869
(1.051) (.121) (.346) (.212)
1972 —.206 1.211 1.611 .471 39.8 .863
(1.187) (.114) (.315) (.225)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.—6—
Table 2
TheDemand for International ReservesbyLDC's
ThatHave OccasionallyAdjustedTheirParity

































































































These results (Tables 1 and 2) indicate that while for the case of
fixed—rate countries (Table 1) the variability (c)termplays an important
role, it is of no importance in determining the level of reserves demanded
by the devaluation countries. On the other hand, the scale and openness
variables (Yand m) are in most years significantly different from zero for
both groups of countries. These results suggest that while fixed—rate
countries demand reserves both for transactions and precautionary motives,
devaluation countries tend to neglect the precautionary motive in their
9/
holdings of international reserves.
From Tables 1 and 2 it may also be noted that the coefficients have been
quite stable through time for both groups of countries. The proposition of
stable demand functions through time was tested using an F—test. This
statistic had a value of F(32,175) =.545for fixed exchange rate countries,
and F(32,130) =.930for devaluation LDC's, indicating that for both groups
of LDC's the demand functions for international reserves had been stable
through 1964—1972.
In order to formally analyze if the long—run coefficients of the demand
for reserves functions for both groups of countries are statistically
different, Gujarathi's (1970) dummy variables method was used. In Table
3 the estimated values for dummy variables for each coefficient (excluding
the constants) corresponding to devaluation LDC's are presented.i" As may
be seen, with the exception of two cases, these dummy variables are always
negative. Furthermore, in most cases, they are significantly different from
zero: out of 27 dummy variables coefficients, 17 are significant, indicating
that the long—run coefficients of the demand for reserves tend to be sig-
nificantly different as between these two groups of countries. These demand—8—
functions seem to be particularly different with respect to the variability
(o) and openness (m) coefficients. For each of them, in six out of nine years,
the dummy variables are significant. These results suggest that studies that
constraint the coefficients for both groups of countries to be equal tend to
generate misleading conclusions. Additionally, an analysis of the residuals
from common (for all countries) regressions show that, on average, these are
significantly negative for devaluation countries, being significantly positive
for fixed—rate countries (see Edwards, 1981). This result indicates that, as
expected, countries willing to use exchange rate adjustments tend to hold less
reserves on average than fixed—rate countries.
The results presented in this section suggest that the decisions to hold
international reserves and to adjust the exchange rate should be viewed as
jointly determined endogenously. Once these two decisions are jointly de-
rived from an optimizing problem, it should be possible to explicitly incor-
porate the determinants of a devaluation into the empirical analysis of the
demand for international reserves, allowing the reunification of the two
groups of countries considered in this paper. This could be done, for example,
by simultaneously estimating the demand for reserves and the probability of
devaluation using a maximum likelihood procedure.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there might be an alternative inter-
pretation to the results reported in this section. It is possible that some
of the devaluation countries adjusted their parities because they were "forced"
to do so, and not because they were more willing to do it. This possibility,
discussed in Harberger and Edwards (1982), is consistent with the hypothesis
that fixed—rate countries have a more prudent attitude towards international re-
serve holding than devaluation countries.—9—
Estimated Dummy Variables for
LDC's that have Adjusted Their Parity:
Cross—Section Results, 1964—1970























































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.—10—
3. The Dynamic Adjustment of the Demand for International Reserves by Less
Developed Countries
The estimates presented in the preceding section assumed that countries
are permanently "on" their long run demand for international reserves. However,
in a well—known article, Clark (1970a) has developed a model that distinguishes
between long—run and short—run demand functions for international reserves.
According to this model there is a trade—off between the speed of adjustment
and the level of reserves a country is willing to hold. Depending on the
country's preferences, the monetary authority chooses an optimal combination
between the speed at which disequilibria are corrected and the optimal level
of reserves. If a country chooses a higher speed of adjustment, it will
require a lower level of reserves in order to face a given probability of
running out of reserves. In this section the dynamics of the adjustment of the
demand for international reserves is investigated for both groups of countries.
In particular, I inquire whether the fact that devaluation countries hold, on
average, less reserves than fixed—rate countries can be partially explained
by a higher speed of adjustment by these countries.
If it is assumed that, at any period of time, a country adjusts (the log
of) its actual reserves in a proportion of the discrepancy between desired
and actual reserves, the following expression can be written:
log Rt —logRtl =r(logR -logR1) (2)
where iT is the speed of adjustment coefficient and R*t is the desired stock
of reserves in period t. The higher is ii, the faster will a current disequilibrium
in the stock of reserves be corrected. If it is assumed that the long—run demand
for international reserves is represented by equation (1), the following equation
can be estimated:—11—
log R =lTb+ lTb1 log + Trb2 log '+irb3 log ct + (1—iT) log Rt_l + e (3)
A problem with the estimation of (3) is that the time period for which data
is available for any particular country is extremely short. A solution for
this problem is to use pooled time—series and cross—section data. This pro-
cedure to estimate dynamic relationships has been previously followed by a
number of authors (i.e., Balestra and Nerlove, 1966; Nerlove, 1971; Bilson
and Frenkel, 1979; Edwards, 1980). The equation to be estimated then is:
log Rnt =lib+ Trb1 log 'tnt + irb2 login + lTb3 log + (l—Tr) log Rnti +ent (4)
where n=l K refers to the K countries in the sample and tl T
refers to the T time periods considered for each country.
In the estimation of this kind of model, it has generally been assumed
that the error term is of the following form (see Balestra and Nerlove, 1966;
Nerlove, 1971; Anderson and Hsiao, 1981):
eu +w (5) nt n nt
where,
E(u) =E(w)
=0 for all n and t






E(w w ) ntms
0 otherwise
Clearly, if the error structure is represented by (5) the estimation of
of (4) by OLS will result in Inconsistent estimates)-" Furthermore, the—12—
coefficient of Rtl will be seriously biased upwards, incorrectly indicating
that once off their long—run demand function, countries will only tend to
return to it very slowly. In order to avoid this problem, equation (5) was
estimated using Nerlove's (1971) two rounds GLS estimation)'
In the estimation of (4) the variables were expressed in real terms.
The reason for this is that, from a theoretical point of view, reserves are
demanded as a buffer stock to finance payment problems of a certain real magni—
13/ tude.— Using Nerlove s (1971) procedure, the following result was obtained
for fixed—rate countries:








where p is the estimated intra—class correlation coefficient (see Nerlove, 1971) and
where the numbers in parentheses are the asymptotic standard errors. Ac-
cording to these results, fixed—rate LDC's will correct 32.1% of a unitary
disequilibrium in the stock of reserves in one year. The long—run coefficients
of the demand for reserves for these countries are b =—2.981;b1 =1.560;
b2 =.822;and b3 =.130.On the other hand, the estimation of (4) yielded
the following result for the devaluation countries:








As may be seen, in this case the speed of adjustment coefficient is higher
than for fixed—rate LDC's ——(1—)=.420——indicatingthat devaluation
countries tend to correct disequilibria in the stock of reserves faster than
fixed—rate countries.--' According to (9), the long—run coefficients of the
demand for reserves by devaluation LDCts are b =—3.814;b1 =.962;
b2 =—.369;and b3 =—.095.
The speed of adjustment coefficients obtained in this study, using
Nerlove's two round estimates, are higher than most of the results obtained
in previous works, and they indicate that, for devaluation countries, after
five years, 94 percent of a reserves disequilibrium would be corrected.
For the case of fixed—rate countries, after five years, 85% of a unitary
disequilibrium would be corrected. This is an important result, since it
indicates that not only is there a stable long—run demand for international
reserves by LDC's, but that these countries tend to correct reserves dis—
equilibria quite fast.
4. Devaluation Crises and International Reserves
It has usually been argued that countries devalue their currencies when
they "run—out" of international reserves (See Bilson, 1979, and Harberger and
Edwards, 1982). However, the level of international reserves that triggers a
devaluation should be measured in relation to the desired level of reserves, and
not with respect to some absolute arbitrary level. In this section the re-
lationship between the level of international reserves actually held by these
countries the year before the devaluation and the short—run desired level of
reserves in that year is analyzed. This analysis gives additional information
on the behavior of LDC's, indicating by how much, on average, actual reserves
have fallen under their desired levels prior to a devaluation. In addition,—14—
this analysis would provide useful information that would help predict de-
valuation ?!crisesI in LDC's.
An analysis of the residuals from Nerlove's two—round estimation procedure
for devaluation countries (equation 7) shows that, for most countries, these
residuals are negative the year prior to the devaluation. This indicates
that when approaching a devaluation decision, reserves have indeed fallen
below their short—run desired level. In order to investigate the magnitude
of this reserves deficiency, equation (4 ) was estimated using a dummy variable
for the year previous to the devaluation. The result obtained using Nerlove's
two—round estimate was:
log R =—1.775÷ .436 log —.165log tmnt —.067log nt
flt







where DEV is a dummy variable for the year previous to a devaluation and
the asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. This result indicates
that the year before a devaluation crisis countries are, on average, 31
percent short of their short run desired level of real international
reserves.—15—
5. Concluding Remarks
The results reported in this paper indicate that not all LDC's behave
in the same way with respect to their demand for international reserves.
In particular, it was shown that countries that have maintained a fixed
exchange rate for a long period of time have a different demand for inter-
national reserves than countries that have occasionally used devaluations to
correct payments imbalances. It was found that while devaluation countries
hold, on average, less reserves than fixed—rate countries, they tend to adjust
towards desired reserves faster. This tends to confirm Clark's (1970) hy-
pothesis of the existence of a trade—off between the level of reserves a
country wants to hold and the speed at which disequilibria are corrected.
These results are important in at least threeways. First, they indicate
that not all LDC's should be pooled for the analysis of internationalreserves.
This is particularly important for the analysis of the distribution and
"adequacy" of international reserves. Usually, in these studies the "adequacy"
of reserves is measured by comparing actual reserves with desiredreserves,
as computed from some demand function (See Kenen and Yudin, 1965, and Bird, 1978).
However, if, for one group of countries, the demand function used as a bench-
mark for the comparison does not correspond to the actual demand function, the
results from these adequacy studies will be misleading. Second, these results
may help explain why, in studies that have not made an explicit distinction be-
tween countries that are willing to adjust their parity, and countries that
maintained a fixed rate, persistent negative residuals were found for some
countries (i.e., the United Kingdom and New Zealand), and persistent positive
residuals were found for others (i.e., Switzerland). (See Frenkel, 1978, p.
128.) In light of the results presented in this paper, the reason for these
persistent patterns of residuals is that these countries have different demand
functions for international reserves. In fact, both the U.K. and New Zealand—16—
had used exchange rate adjustments (even before 1973) to correct payments im-
balances, while Switzerland had traditionally ruled out a devaluation as a
policy tool. Also, the results obtained indicate that LDC's tend to correct
disequilibria situations between desired and actual reserves quite quickly.
Finally, the analysis presented in this paper suggests that the decisions
about reserve holdings and exchange rate adjustments should be viewed as
simultaneously determined endogenously. This indicates that international
reserve models should be able to generate, from a maximizing framework, the
joint determination of these decisions.—17—
APPENDIX
A. Data Sources
International Reserves: Taken from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) tape.
Income: Measured as GNP in domestic currency units, converted into U.S. $
usingthe average exchange rate. Raw data taken from the IFS tape.
Average Propensity to Import: Defined as the ratio of imports to GNP.
Variability Measure (a):Tocalculate for year T for country n, the
following regression was first run for that country:
R =a =at+e overtT—14,...T,
t o T t







The variability measure ——a —— wasthen defined as:
aT =OT/IMT,
where IM are imports. For further details, see Bilson and
Frenkel (1979).
8. Countries Considered

























In the studies by Bilson and Frenkel (1979), Clark (1970b), Frenkel (1974),
(1978), (1980), Heller and Khan (1978), Hipple (1974), and Kelly (1970),
for example, different demand functions for developed and less developed
countries were estimated. The literature on the demand for international
reserves has been extensively reviewed. See, for example, Clower and
Lipsey (1968), Gruebel (1971), and Williamson (1973). See also the studies
published by the International Finance Section of Princeton University and
by the International Monetary Fund. On the demand for international re-
serves by LDC's, see Bird (1978).
An exception to this are the studies by Kelly (1970), Flanders (1971) and
Ripple (1974). These authors have used dummy variables to capture countries'
attitudes towards maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Their results, how-
ever, have been inconclusive.
This proposition can be easily derived from a model of the demand for
international reserves for precautionary motives. In this case, the de-
sired level of reserves can be written as (see Whalen, 1966)
R* =(22
C)1/3
where C is the (fixed) cost of running out of reserves, is the varia-
bility of net external payments, and I is the opportunity cost of holding
reserves. In this context, it is possible to think that both and C
will be lower in countries that are willing to adjust their parity to
correct payments imbalances than in fixed exchange rate countries.
In a more complicated model, derived by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980),
it can be shown that if 2 is different for both groups of countries, the
elasticities of the demand for reserves with respect to its determinants
will differ among groups of countries.—19—
Ripley and Suss (1974), for example, estimate a common demand function to
analyze reserves "needs" and distribution for 104 countries. However,
their results ——thatshow that reserves are unequally distributed ——depend
heavily on the incorrect assumption that all countries have the same demand
function.
The period of analysis has been confined to 1964—1972 for two reasons:
first, in this way, the problem that arises after 1972, when the inter-
national monetary system turned to a (managed) floating system, is avoided.
Second, in this way we can make sure to have enough observations for the
cross—section analysis for fixed exchange rate countries. For a list of
the countries considered, see the Appendix. Most of these countries had
one devaluation during the period considered, not allowing to test the rele-
vance of alternative country groupings (i.e., groupings according to the
number of devaluations). By only including countries with devaluations of
at least 10%, a distinction is being made between countries that adjust their
exchange rate in order to correct international payments imbalances (or balance
of payments crises) and countries that have followed managed float, crawling
peg, or institutionalized devaluation systems. For further discussion on
these countries' classification, see Harberger and Edwards (1982).
However, some authors ——Heller(1966), Kelly (1970), Heller and Khan
(1978) ——haveconsidered the marginal propensity to import as a measure
of the adjustment cost. In this case there should be a negative relation-
ship between the marginal propensity to import and the demand for inter-
national reserves.
See, for example, Frenkel (1974, 1978), Hipple (1974), Heller and Khan
(1978) and Saidi (1981). A possible reason for these findings is that
international reserves are usually held in some form of interest—bearing
assets. lyoha (1974) and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) have been able to—20—
find significant coefficients for the opportunity cost of holding reserves.
See the Appendix for the exact definition, and sources, of the variables
involved.
On the precautionary motive to hold reserves, and exchange rate adjust-
ments, see Makin (1974). See, also, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981).
This method consists of estimating a common equation with dummy variables
for the coefficients corresponding to one of the groups. If these dummy
variables are significantly different from zero, then the hypothesis of
a common demand function is rejected. See Gujarathi (1970). The dummies
for the constants were never significant.
11/ . . — Thereason for this is that the e s will be serially correlated [i.e.,
E(e e1) =21in the presence of a lagged dependent variable.
This procedure consists of estimating, in the first round, the U's as
fixed terms using individual country dummy variables. is estimated as
the first round regression variance. In the second round, and are used
U W
to obtain the GLS estimator. See Nerlove (1971) for further details.
Recently Anderson and Hsiao (1981) have suggested an equivalent consistent
e st ima to r.
Traditionally, however, most studies have used nominal data. Machlup
(1976) challenged this practice, and Von Furstenberg (1980) has recently
argued that the demand for reserves should be estimated in real terms.
Recent studies have recognized that the correct specification of the
demand for international reserves should be in real terms. See, for
example, Saidi (1981). In the present case, however, the results are
not altered in any sisnificant way if (4 )isestimated in nominal terms.
See Edwards (1981).—21—
It is important to note that the estimated speed of adjustment coeffi-
cients using Nerlove's (1971) GLS procedure are, as expected, significantly
higher than those obtained using OLS.—22—
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